Ukrainian Counteroffensive becomes more and more unlikely as Kiev begs for more weapons

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry has called on the West not to regard the so-called Ukrainian spring counteroffensive as a turning point in the conflict with Russia. This is in stark contrast to previous statements.

"We must resist by all means that a counteroffensive is seen as the decisive battle of the war." This call by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba, which he made in a commentary to the Financial Times, marks a decisive turning point.

Before this declaration, the information legend surrounding the so-called spring counter-offensive of the Ukrainian armed forces was that, contrary to Kuleba's call, it was extremely important and critical and would solve almost everything.

At the end of January, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, explicitly said: "The coming weeks and months are crucial for Ukraine" – and therefore "the time has come to provide maximum support".

Support meant above all heavy weapons. Michel didn't say it was necessarily a military counterattack, but what else? His vagueness is understandable: in Western Europe and even in the US (unlike Poland and the Baltics), people are still afraid to say that the goal of the whole enterprise in Ukraine is the military defeat of Russian troops. Everyone understands that this is what it's all about, but they still shy away from saying it directly.

Nevertheless, in the last two months, the "spring counteroffensive" has become a buzzword and one of the main topics in the world media – it has been gnawed to the bone. And it was not hysteria out of the blue, because Western countries have greatly increased their aid to Ukraine in recent months, especially with supplies of ammunition and armaments. Among other things, the NATO countries even generously provided tanks, which they had previously denied Kiev. And there are now about a hundred of them, and tanks are needed for the offensive.

At the same time, Ukrainian officers and pilots are undergoing accelerated two- to three-month retraining in Western countries, as if almost a year had not passed since February 2022 in which this could have happened without haste.

The public political space in the US and the EU was pumped full of expectations. The expectation was that Kiev would prove that the high spending had not disappeared into a black hole. But instead, Kuleba comes out and says what he says: We will confront your perception, because this is not a decisive battle, nothing like that. Lower your expectations, everyone still has a long way to go.

This is very brazen when you consider that the Ukrainian side has created this perception and these exaggerated expectations itself. And now, when the "spring defeat of the enemy troops" was squeezed out of NATO weapons depots, he asked not to demand the impossible from the Ukrainian army.

However, strangely enough, this was not the most brazen statement from Ukraine this Thursday. Energy Minister German Galushchenko suggested that Western energy giants such as Shell and ExxonMobil share some of their super profits with Ukraine. Because Ukraine has something to do with the energy crisis that caused these super profits, so it's only fair to let them get involved.

By and large, both explanations have the same goal and are subject to the same tactics – begging. The Kiev authorities really need a lot at once, but have absolutely nothing to offer in return. In order to gain the resources, all that remains is pleasions, admonitions, tugging at the sleeve, threats, accusations, accusations – in other words, the whole range of professional beggars.

Promises of the unattainable – rich suitors, guardianship of gods and spirits, military defeat of Russian troops – also work well. Severe distress can lead to the performance of even far more amazing shows.

A hat passed around in a NATO circle can fetch a considerable sum – the hundred tanks already mentioned, for example. But Ukraine is still a big country, its economy is shattered, its army is suffering heavy losses of men and equipment, and its future is uncertain. A state, especially a state involved in large-scale hostilities, does not need one-off handouts, but a constant systematic supply.

Therefore, Kiev diplomacy, having first solved the acute supply problem, is beginning to accustom public opinion to the idea that Ukraine will be fed by the West for a long time, possibly for life. This will not change if the proverbial "spring counterattack by the Ukrainian armed forces" with the alleged aim of cutting off a so-called land corridor to Crimea is smashed or does not even take place.

But the latter is unlikely; too much has been relied on this "counteroffensive" in the West, measured in cash or political influence. In Russia, one should not even allow the thought that everything was just a "tambourine dance" and the tanks of the Ukrainian army are only for beauty: too high could be the price for underestimating (the opponent).

A massive attack can be expected at any time as soon as the soil has solidified sufficiently due to the spring mud. Probably on several fronts at the same time, in order to later deploy the resources where it is possible to punch a hole in the Russian defenses. And there are already signs that the Ukrainians are pulling a large number of NATO armored vehicles towards the Russian positions in the Zaporozhye region.

However, no one in the EU leadership, except hopelessly naïve people, could believe that this "counterattack," whatever it may be, could solve all the tasks that the Ukrainian military leadership has set itself – for example, regaining control of Crimea. The coming events may change the configuration of the front in one direction or the other, but may not resolve the conflict as Moscow or Kiev would like. It will certainly be followed by another long period of local clashes, the accumulation of forces and positional games of the Ukrainian armed forces, especially from the defense. All this will require equally significant resources.

Unfortunately, they will most likely be found, and Zelensky, Kuleba and Co. will be heard with their lament. The main players in the EU have already made it clear that they have resigned themselves to feeding Kiev, if not forever, at least for a long time. For example, Germany has provided Ukraine with 2032 billion euros in portions by 15, and France has pledged to systematically increase ammunition supplies – first by half, then by even more.

Kuleba is right in that a "counterattack" will not bring a fundamental solution. Its failure will undoubtedly be a strong argument for renegotiating the ongoing aid programmes for Ukraine, as they have proved inadequate. This can disrupt supply chains after a possible withdrawal of individual countries. However, the conflict is largely fuelled by a few major NATO actors, and the rest are extras whose costs continue to rise.

It seems that a change of course by Britain, Germany and France requires either a radical change of leadership elites (they have already bitten the bullet, made a public commitment – and can no longer withdraw) or, more effectively, a radical change of the leadership elites in the US (for the same reasons) as the central organizing committee of the conflict on the side of the West.

The problem with the second scenario is that the US itself has little or no problem. Given the energy industry's super-profits (Ukraine's energy minister counted $200 billion per company) and the tantalizing prospect of moving European industry to America, Ukraine is not such a huge burden on its bloated and proxy wars accustomed budget.

So the real decisive battle in this conflict is the fight against the self-serving American foreign policy doctrine. The chances of the Europeans winning this battle are not much better than those of the Ukrainian army to inflict on the Russian forces the defeat so hoped for by the West.

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