Russian measures to prevent a Ukrainian offensive

The absence of the long-awaited Ukrainian offensive is not only related to bad weather or insufficient arms deliveries. Above all, actions by the Russian armed forces reduce the chances of success of the offensive and could prevent it altogether.

The latest missile strike against the objects of the military-industrial complex of Ukraine in Pavlograd continues to be intensively discussed on the net. These discussions concern not only the spectacular footage of explosions, but also questions about which objects are in Pavlograd. It is primarily a major logistics and warehouse hub that is likely to be used by the Ukrainian military for its presumed counteroffensive.

Experts have also suggested that the actions of the Russian Armed Forces should systematically thwart the preparation of the Ukrainian military for such an offensive. This is demonstrated not only by the attacks on Pavlograd, but also by a number of other operations carried out by the Russian army recently.

As military science generally states, the best method of repelling an enemy offensive would be to obstruct or thwart the offensive in question. This goal could be achievable if eight tasks were solved.

"The first and most important task today is the work of reconnaissance, whether by satellites, agents or troops. Reconnaissance must determine the place and time of the main enemy attack. If we have all the necessary information, we will be able to carry out massive strikes against areas of troop concentration and destroy accumulations of enemy personnel and equipment while they are still deployed," said military expert Mikhail Onufrienko.

Special attention should be paid to revealing the enemy's movement routes. For just as the offensive is not possible without a concentration of troops, concentration is not possible without the transfer of troops from the rear. Accordingly, reconnaissance must determine the main routes of movement of the opposing troops and the key points of their concentration.

How this happens in reality can be deduced from the latest report of the Russian Ministry of Defense. "On the Torskoye sector of the front and near the Serebryanka forest district, the units and reconnaissance officers of the Center grouping unmasked the positions of the 81st Airborne Assault Brigade and the 58th Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In the event of an attack by artillery and air forces, the enemy suffered personnel losses," the May 2 report said.

Then comes the second task, which is the attacks against Ukrainian positions. "In the attacks, we have to destroy the Ukrainian military with long-range weapons – with missiles, drones, in short, massive missile and bomb attacks are necessary. We need to use the Airborne Forces to the fullest, which we had not done so far, because not all of the enemy's air defense means have been destroyed," the expert noted.

The use of long-range weapons was reported for the newspaper Vsglyad by a pilot of the Su-34 fighter jet, which is participating in the military operation. Among other things, he reported on the use of the latest bombs, which were equipped with a universal module for gliding and target correction.

The third component of the disruption of enemy plans is attacks not only against accumulations of troops, but also against facilities where the means necessary for warfare are located. The troops must be supplied with ammunition, fuel, supplies, food, water and more. After all, no tank can drive without fuel, and a gun cannot shoot without ammunition. For example, at the end of April, the Russian group South reported the destruction of a Ukrainian ammunition depot near Artyomovsk.

"We need to destroy the enemy's entire transport infrastructure, all the logistics, so that he has nowhere to flee and does not get supplies. Therefore, not only troops and infrastructure, but also ammunition and equipment depots must be attacked. Our reconnaissance can determine supply routes based on the frequency of use of radio signals. However, it should be borne in mind that the Ukrainian military can also move signal sources for the purpose of deception," Onufrienko explains.

The fourth component of thwarting the offensive must become attacks on enemy staffs. Depriving the opposing side of its leadership is considered a highlight of the art of war. In this case, we are talking about the elimination of the Ukrainian military leadership, that is, high-ranking officers, commanders, generals, even during their meetings.

The particular difficulty here is that such meetings take place at a certain time and are short-lived. Accordingly, the attack must be planned in such a way that the weapons reach their target exactly when the enemy is on site. Such meetings do not necessarily have to take place in bunkers, especially taking into account today's means of communication. Any stationary objects can be used for this purpose.

As follows from the reports of the Russian Ministry of Defense, this work is being carried out successfully. So, for example, on April 20, the combined staff of the Ukrainian Army Group "Bakhmut" was attacked.

The fifth group of targets are communication nodes and the disruption of the exchange of information of the enemy command. As a rule, this takes place intensively a few hours before the start of an offensive. Everything – up to Starlink terminals – must be subject to jamming signals in the context of electronic warfare. For example, on May 2, the Southern Group reported the destruction of a Ukrainian communications node in the Donetsk People's Republic.

The sixth group of targets is known even without extensive reconnaissance work. This is transport infrastructure, because without punctual supplies, no combat operations are possible. The Russian armed forces have to attack railway junctions, bridges, important crossroads, railway substations and the like. This is especially true for routes connecting Ukraine with Poland. Basically, the attack on Pavlograd was one of the most brilliant examples of such actions.

The seventh component is also important, namely attacks on production and repair facilities for military technology. "Here, the most important task is to destroy everything that leaves the cover, to intercept it already in transit. After that, places of production and repair of military technology will have to be attacked. As a result, the enemy will not be able to move the technology from the front to the repair and back fast enough. Western technology is being repaired far away in Poland and Romania anyway."

On April 30, the Ministry of Defense reported the fulfillment of such a task: "Near the village of Zvesa, Sumy region, a repair plant for military equipment and weapons of the 117th Brigade of Territorial Defense was attacked."

Finally, the eighth task consists of attacks on the hinterland. As a rule, the troops begin their deployment, i.e. their movement to the staging areas for an offensive, a few days or hours before the so-called hour X. The task of reconnaissance is to reveal the timing of the enemy's deployment and the concentration of troops in certain places. And then the Russian Armed Forces will have to attack the troops that are deploying, but have not yet gone on the offensive. The fulfillment of this task is now still pending – shortly before the imminent start of the Ukrainian offensive.

"It is also important not to let up in the fight against enemy air defense. The lack of air defense is a serious problem of the Ukrainian military, because the attacking units cannot be fully protected from air strikes. In addition, it is important to track down and destroy those staffs responsible for Ukraine's cyber operations," said military expert Alexei Leonkov.

"Because it is precisely the cyber specialists, including a number of Western ones, who are doubly securing the command system of the Ukrainian military on the ground in the event that we incapacitate the satellite system that provides them with information. All these measures, taken together, will lead to high losses of the Ukrainian military as part of the announced offensive and will help us achieve the goals of the military operation, because it is becoming more and more difficult for Ukraine to create new combat formations," Leonkov summed up.

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