Could be the Chinese peace initiative the way to peace?

Whether China's 12-point plan to resolve the Ukraine crisis will be implemented depends on the will of the parties to the conflict. The Kremlin considers it balanced and groundbreaking, Kiev expresses interest, the West, on the other hand, sees it as no basis for negotiations. But even without Western involvement, contractual arrangements could be achieved.

After settling the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Beijing leadership is seeking another diplomatic success by offering itself as a mediator in the Ukraine war. With the 12-point plan, it has presented a document that highlights the complexity of the conflict. The demands make it clear who the addressees of the Chinese criticism are, even if they are not explicitly named. Russia is accused of violating the prohibition of violence under international law by invading Ukraine. The West is accused of violating the principle of the indivisibility of security and thereby causing the current crisis situation. In order to disguise his aggressive policy, he would have reinterpreted international law, which Russia is currently invoking.

The reaction of the Western political elite leaves no doubt that the Chinese peace initiative is undesirable. A concession, for example in the creation of a European security architecture or the lifting of economic sanctions, is therefore not to be expected. The Kiev leadership has shown itself to be open to this. If negotiations were to take place, the group of participants would be limited to Russia and Ukraine.

Should a peace agreement be reached, the pressure on the Western states would increase significantly. In particular, they would be called upon to return to the original understanding of international law. Interference in the internal affairs of other countries (successor states of the Soviet Union, Venezuela, China), the questionable claim to preventive self-defense (Afghanistan, Iraq), humanitarian interventions (Yugoslavia, Libya) and economic sanctions (Iran, Syria, Russia) would have to be avoided. Instead of invoking values and its rules-based order, the West would have to accept the world's multipolarity. Should he continue to act arrogantly and arbitrarily, he would increasingly isolate himself. However, this would seriously endanger its global dominance.

Elements of a treaty to end hostilities

Supporting the Chinese initiative is obviously not in the West's interest, let alone participation in negotiations. There will therefore be no comprehensive agreement containing commitments and commitments by the NATO countries. Central Russian demands, which China's 12-point plan also raises, would thus remain unfulfilled. What remains is the first postulate in the text, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Although this would require unilateral concessions from Russia, a negotiated solution seems quite possible. The provisions that the treaty should contain are set out in the following nine points.

1. Russia withdraws its military units from the territory of Ukraine. At the same time, the Ukrainian army is leaving the part of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts under its control. UN troops are moving into the demilitarized areas, with the exception of the area belonging to the Kharkov Oblast, which falls to Kiev. The stationing of blue helmets can be based on the division of labour. China could be responsible for Donetsk, India for Lugansk and Brazil for parts of Kherson and Zaporozhye oblasts. Executive power in the regions is exercised by UN commissioners.

2. Ukraine declares itself neutral and amends the relevant passage in the Constitution. This means, in particular, that it does not join any military alliance and does not allow foreign military units to be stationed. Nor may it act on behalf of foreign powers, for example for the purpose of threatening neighbouring states. It receives security guarantees from the countries involved in the peace process (China, India, Brazil), if possible also from the UN Security Council.

3. The Russian leadership and parliament revoke the transfer of the four Ukrainian oblasts into Russian territory and the prior recognition of the independence of the Donetsk and Lugansk Republics. At the same time, they confirm that the territories under UN supervision are Ukrainian territory.

4. Soon after the peace treaty comes into force, local decision-makers will be elected, reporting to the UN commissioners of the oblasts. The elections are held in the presence of independent observers, who at the same time ensure that there is no propaganda for the Russian or Ukrainian side during the election campaign and that the candidates concentrate on regional tasks.

5. Reconciliation commissions shall be established in which all political and linguistic groups shall be represented. Its task is to detect and criticize provocative and defamatory statements by the media and political leaders. They must also ensure that political neutrality is maintained in government services. The UN commissioners can impose conditions if necessary and, in serious cases, ban media, confiscate publications and remove politicians.

6. The current legal and financial systems, as well as citizenships and social entitlements, will remain in place, but further integration into Russian or Ukrainian systems will be prevented. Local decision-makers are called upon to seek practicable solutions in consultation with the UN Commissioners if problems arise.

7. Russia agrees to pay 100 billion euros for the war damage. Of this, 20 percent will be transferred to the Kiev government and the rest will be used for reconstruction in the regions under UN supervision. The projects are implemented by the local representations, subject to approval by the UN commissioners.

8. After five years, referendums will be held on the future of the four UN-controlled oblasts, as the situation is likely to have consolidated in the meantime. The choice is reintegration into Ukraine and joining Russia. The required quorum is 50 percent for the first option and 75 percent for the second option. If none of the quorums is reached, UN status is maintained. In this case, a new vote shall be scheduled five years later.

9. Since the situation in Crimea is considered to be stable, a referendum will be held on the same terms immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty. If less than 75 percent of the vote votes for Russia, Moscow pledges to reverse the annexation of Crimea and withdraw its military. Moreover, if less than 50 percent vote for Ukraine, Crimea, like the four oblasts in the east and south of the country, will be placed under UN control.

The likelihood that both Russia and Ukraine will accept such a treaty solution is quite high. This is likely to be preceded by a period of consultation, as well as several rounds of negotiations, with support from China and possibly India and Brazil. The interest of both warring parties in a peace agreement is based on the recognition that the remaining alternatives are always worse. These are an ongoing war of position, the Korean solution favored by the West, a Ukrainian capitulation and an escalation with the risk of a nuclear exchange. The previous reluctance on both the US and Russian sides fuels the hope that the latter alternative can be ruled out.

The peace treaty as the best possible option for Ukraine

Ukraine's declared goal is to recapture all parts of the country under Russian control, including Crimea. At the same time, representatives of the Kiev leadership state that the military equipment received from the West is nowhere near sufficient for a successful offensive. Another problem concerns the handling of Western weapons, since the Ukrainian army has so far fought mainly with familiar equipment from the Soviet era. Finally, there are growing difficulties in mobilisation and too few experienced staff. Given these facts, military experts believe that the Ukrainian plan will fail, especially since Russia has much greater potential.

If Kiev nevertheless undertakes an attack, then the probable failure can be considered a necessary event in order to subsequently come to terms with the status quo. A new goal could be a ceasefire, according to the analysis of the RAND Corporation, according to which Ukraine would lose the territories controlled by Russia and would have to declare itself neutral. However, this freezing of the conflict, dubbed the Korean model, would appear to be a defeat and would be difficult to convey, which the RAND paper identifies as the biggest problem today.

In contrast, the peace solution presented here on the basis of the Chinese 12-point plan has the advantage that Kiev's objective would be largely achieved. This is mainly the complete withdrawal of the Russian military. By cancelling the takeover of the four Ukrainian oblasts, Moscow would also have recognized their affiliation with Ukraine. On top of that, Kiev would receive compensation. A Ukrainian victory frenzy would be clouded by the fact that the territories evacuated by Russia would be placed under UN control and Crimea would most likely be lost in the referendum.

The advantage of a peace agreement over a frozen conflict is that both sides share the same legal position. This undermines future controversies that could flare up in the event of an unresolved territorial dispute. Since Kiev would not be dependent on external support in view of the resolved conflict situation, it would gain greater political room for manoeuvre. This is significant because the Ukrainian leadership must assume that the criteria for EU accession cannot be met in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, new options could open up, such as closer cooperation with Asian partners.

The military strategies favored in Russia

In Russia, two positions on the continuation of military action dominate the debate. Some analysts favor the goal of a complete capture of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts and a subsequent defensive war, another the elimination of the Ukrainian war machine and subsequent surrender of Kiev.

In the first case, several urban complexes would have to be captured, above all Kramatorsk and Slovisk. As the completely devastated Artyomovsk (Bakhmut) shows, considerable destruction of buildings and infrastructure as well as high personnel losses would have to be accepted. After the conquest, continued border skirmishes and missile attacks on the hinterland would create permanent insecurity and hinder reconstruction.

The second alternative would require Russia to carry out large-scale offensive operations, involving considerable personnel casualties and massive destruction of military equipment. After a Ukrainian capitulation, there would be the possibility of putting Kiev under pressure and perhaps even exerting direct influence on its policy, for example after the formation of a broad unity government with the participation of pro-Russian forces. At the same time, however, Moscow would have to reckon with guerrilla activities that can hardly be prevented in a territorial state like Ukraine. From their strongholds in the western part of the country, rebel units could even invade Russian territory. They would be generously supported by the West with weapons.

In both military conceptions, the confrontation with the West would continue. The information war would not abate, and a withdrawal of sanctions would still be out of the question. Even though the Russian economy is largely robust, there are some setbacks that could spread in the future. The Korea model of the RAND Corporation, in which a reduction of sanctions is promised, would therefore be preferred as an alternative. Since it involves freezing the conflict, the situation at the front would calm down. After all, the planned neutralization of Ukraine would meet a key Russian demand.

Russia's Benefits of a Peace Treaty

However, the Korean solution would not only have advantages over the military options, but also seems to overshadow the draft treaty presented here. Russia would retain control over the four oblasts in southern and eastern Ukraine and would not need to revise their transfer to the Russian state.

However, the Kremlin would henceforth be dependent on the goodwill of the West, which has proven fatal several times in the past. Even before the start of the Ukraine war, it became clear that the Washington leadership and its European advocates were not seeking reconciliation with Russia, but rather seeking its lasting weakening. This goal would undoubtedly be pursued after the forced tactical withdrawal.

For example, Ukraine's commitment to neutrality could be undermined, as is currently happening with NATO's creative interpretation of the rotation principle in the Baltics. In general, the country would continue to be integrated into the Western system and could thus be used as a spearhead against Russia. Neither border provocations nor attacks by rebel groups could be ruled out. Against the background of the unresolved territorial conflict, a pretext could also be constructed to reinstate economic sanctions that have already been lifted. In imposing anti-Russian measures, the West is likely to feel encouraged by the fact that Moscow's interpretation of the legal situation concerning the annexation of the four Ukrainian oblasts does not receive international support.

Compared to a mere ceasefire, a peace treaty would have the advantage that there would no longer be any points of conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The Kremlin should be reassured that the Ukrainian leadership has no reason to allow itself to be instrumentalized by Washington. However, the situation could become tense as the referenda approaches. Both Moscow and Kiev would do everything in their power to win the favor of the population in the UN-controlled areas. This could also have positive consequences, because competition would benefit the reconstruction of Donbass. Ukraine is also likely to feel compelled to respect the rights of the Russian minority.

Crimea would remain with Russia in view of the expected vote. Ukraine's acceptance of the peace treaty would be a prerequisite for its status to be internationally recognised. Not only would the accusations of violation of international law and discrimination against the inhabitants of the peninsula be a thing of the past, but the last reason to maintain Western sanctions would also be eliminated.

If the votes in the four Ukrainian oblasts of September 2022 were representative with results between 87 percent in Kherson and 98 percent in Lugansk, a decision in favor of Russia would be expected after five years. The disappointment over the interrupted integration into the Russian state system would be more than offset by the end of the military threat and the secured future status. If, in the meantime, Kiev succeeds in advancing domestic reconciliation by pushing back ultra-nationalist ideas, not even the return of some areas to Ukraine would be ruled out. In this case, the Russian leadership could console itself with the fact that at least the goal of "denazification" has been achieved.

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